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Despite still being younger than a decade, the theory of multisided market has 
offered numerous valuable insights for the analysis of industries in which a 
supplier serves  two distinct customer groups that are indirectly interrelated by 
externalities. Examples include payment systems, matching agencies, commer-
cial media and software platforms. However, professional sports markets have 
largely been neglected so far in this kind of research although they possess the 
characteristics of multisided markets. We contribute to filling this gap by de-
scribing the platform elements of professional suppliers of sports events and 
outlining issues where an application of this theoretical framework is likely to 
provide valuable insights and to add to the existing knowledge. Among these 
problems are integrative pricing strategies of sports clubs towards such different 
customer groups like attendees, broadcasters, sponsors, etc., including their 
welfare and antitrust implications, design decisions of sports associations in or-
der to promote positive feedback loops among the customer groups as well as 
management strategies to reinforce positive externalities among customer 
groups and alleviate negative ones. 
 
We thank Anna Lund Jepsen for valuable comments on an earlier version of 
this paper and Barbara Güldenring for excellent editorial assistance. 
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1.  Introduction 
During the last decade, the theory of multisided markets has been developed in 
order to analyse markets that differ from ‘ordinary’ goods markets in regard to 
the customer structure. An ‘ordinary’ goods market is generally modelled as 
suppliers competing for a definable group of costumers. In the case of multi-
product firms, this implies that these firms act on more than one relevant mar-
ket, each of which can be analysed as a distinct (product) market. However, 
there are some markets in which firms deal with distinct groups of costumers 
despite basically offering only one product. For instance, a magazine supplier 
deals with ‘reader’ costumers who buy the final magazine as well as with ‘ad-
vertiser’ costumers who buy advertisement space in the magazine. The analysis 
of such kinds of markets with the standard theory tools requires to construct 
distinctive markets for each costumer group, in the exemplary case a reader 
market and an advertiser market. Although many important insights about the 
competitive interactions can be derived by conducting such an analysis, one 
important aspect becomes neglected: the construction of two distinct markets 
(i.e. reader market and advertiser market) inherently neglects the interrelation of 
the two distinct costumer groups (i.e. readers and advertisers) and, therefore, 
tends to overlook several important implications for the competitive strategies 
of the suppliers on such markets, who will rationally consider these interrela-
tions of their customer groups. Thus, employing the theory of – in the exem-
plary case – two-sided markets, which basically mean to view the supplier and 
the – here: two – distinct customer groups as acting on one and the same mar-
ket,
1 adds additional insights. 
 
                                                            
1   The name ‘two-sided’ market was originally chosen to characterize the two sides of demand (cos-
tumer groups) a supplier on such a market must deal with. However, since every market consists of 
‘two sides’ in a different sense (supply and demand), the adequateness of this name is subject to con-
troversy (e.g. Evans & Schmalensee 2007). Next to the simple enhancement towards cases of more 
than two distinct costumer groups (‘multisided’ markets), the term ‘platform’ markets is preferred by 
some. Yet, ‘two-sided’ or ‘multisided’ respectively seem to be the established terms, wherefore we 
will use them in the following.  
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Consequently, the theory of multisided markets has and still generates manifold 
valuable insights to the analysis of markets like credit cards, media, software 
platforms, brokerage and many more. However, it yet to comprehensively enter 
into the analysis of professional sports markets
2 although they also possess the 
typical characteristics of multisided markets. We attempt to fill this gap by out-
lining the potential of this analytical concept for sports markets. In doing so, we 
first provide an overview on important elements of the theoretical concept and 
its previous applications (section 2). Then, we redesign professional sports 
markets as multisided markets in order to demonstrate the applicability of the 
concept (section 3). Eventually, we outline some implications for the analysis 
of sports business (section 4). Finally, section 5 concludes. 
2.  The Theory of Multisided Markets 
The genesis of the more general theory of multisided markets was inspired by 
economic expert analysis into the market for payment cards in the course of an-
titrust proceedings (Rochet & Tirole 2002; Schmalensee 2002), in particular 
challenging the business behaviour of VISA and MasterCard (Evans 2003: 27-
30, 62-64). However, it was soon realised that the particular features of multi-
sided markets encompass more industries and, therefore, a comprehensive gen-
eral concept was developed by seminal contributions (Caillaud & Jullien 2003; 
Evans 2003; Rochet & Tirole 2003; Armstrong 2006) as well as by paradigm-
consolidating surveys and progress reports (Roson 2005; Rochet & Tirole 2006; 
Armstrong 2007; Evans & Schmalensee 2007). Two of the pioneers, Rochet & 
Tirole (2006) provide the following definition: “A market is two-sided if the 
platform can affect the volume of transactions by charging more to one side of 
the market and reducing the price paid by the other side by an equal amount; in 
other words, the price structure matters, and platforms must design it so as to 
bring both sides on board.” More generally, a multisided market requires   
(Evans & Schmalensee 2007) 
                                                            
2   Exemptions include Hartwich (2007), Bae & Kwon (2008) and Lyons (2009).  
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•  the existence of at least two distinct (i.e. clearly distinguishable and de-
limitable) customer groups, 
•  which are indirectly connected by externalities, and  
•  these externalities cannot be sufficiently internalised (f.i. side-payments 
and arbitrage do not work because of transaction costs). 
 
This framework has been applied to several different markets (see table 1 and 
Evans 2003; Roson 2005; Armstrong 2007; Evans & Schmalensee 2007). Nota-
bly commercial media that is at least partly financed by advertising has been 
one of the prime applications (Anderson & Gabszewicz 2006; Kaiser & Wright 
2006; Kind et al. 2007; Dewenter & Haucap 2009). Due to their relative close-
ness to the multisided phenomena on sports markets, we will use insights from 
advertising-revenue financed media for the purpose of illustrating the more 
general implications of the multisided market framework. 
 
The first set of typical implications from analyzing markets as being multisided 
concerns the price structure. Any supplier in such a market faces at least two 
distinct customer groups and his price-setting towards the two customer groups 
(say A and B) interacts with each other. If a supplier increases the price for A-
customers, then demand from A-customers decreases (standard demand reac-
tion assumed). However, due to the externality between the two customer 
groups, B-customers will also be affected. Assume that there is a positive exter-
nality, i.e. B-customers as a group benefit from the relative participation of A 
(i.e. quantity of A-demand). Thus, B-demand will decrease as a consequence of 
the decrease of A-demand. If the positive externality runs into both directions, 
then the decrease of B-demand decreases utility of A-customers, wherefore a 
further decrease of A-demand as a consequence of the decrease  of  B-demand 
might come into play – and so forth (positive feedback loop; self-reinforcing 
development).   
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Table 1.  Examples of Multisided Markets 
Industry  Distinct Customer 
Groups  Externalities (exemplary)
Transaction Systems, like 
credit cards (etc.) 
a.  merchants (accepting 
the card as payment) 
b.  consumers (paying 
with card) 
If participation of a in-
creases, then participation 
of b will c.p. increase (a Ç 
Î b Ç). 
b Ç Î a Ç 
Matching Agencies, like 
employment agencies and 
dating agencies (or travel 
agencies, etc.) 
a.  unemployed / male 
singles  
b.  companies with va-
cancies / female sin-
gles 
a Ç Î b Ç 
b Ç Î a Ç 
Brokers, like estate agents 
(or: stock markets, auction 
houses, etc.) 
a.  estate owners wanting 
to sell 
b.  potential buyers of es-
tate 
a Ç Î b Ç 
b Ç Î a Ç 
Media Markets, like maga-
zines (or newspapers, 
commercial TV, commer-
cial radio, etc.) 
a.  readers 
b.  advertisers 
a Ç Î b Ç 
b Ç Î a È (?) 
Software Platforms, like 
operating systems  
a.  application soft-
ware developers 
b.  users 
a Ç Î b Ç 
b Ç Î a Ç 
Video Games  a.  game developers 
b.  players 
a Ç Î b Ç 
b Ç Î a Ç 
 
However, even if the first step – B-demand decreasing as a consequence of de-
creasing A-demand – exists, this does not necessarily imply that customer 
group A also benefits from customer group B. Let us assume that a magazine is 
partly financed through the price that readers pay and partly through advertising 
revenues. Group A might be the readers, group B the advertisers. If the maga-
zine publisher increases the price for the magazine, the demand from readers  
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will probably decrease. However, with fewer readers, the magazine loses attrac-
tiveness for advertisers who want to reach as large of an ‘audience’ as possible. 
In other words, there is a positive externality from the ‘participation’ of the cus-
tomer group readers (A) towards the benefit for the customer group advertisers 
(B). Yet, this must not necessarily be the same the other way around. More ad-
vertisement (= higher ‘participation’ from group B) might well make the maga-
zine less attractive for costumers who feel distracted by the dominance of ad-
vertising. This would represent a negative externality from A towards B. 
 
When setting prices towards the two costumer groups, a rational supplier will 
take into account these interrelations between his costumer groups. Instead of 
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for the case if demand quantity from customer group A decreases, then c.p. de-
mand quantity from customer group B increases (price effects ignored). 
 
Considering this special price-setting situation for the supplier yields two im-
portant implications of multisided markets theory:  
 
¾ the rule ‘price equals marginal cost’ is usually not optimal for competitive 
suppliers; the rule ‘marginal revenue equals marginal cost’ is usually not 
optimal for monopolists, and 
 
¾ prices below marginal costs for one customer group can be efficient and 
in line with competition; they do not necessarily represent (anticompeti-
tive) predatory pricing. 
 
Let us illustrate this by looking at commercial media markets, for instance the 
markets for magazines or newspapers: if the supplier sets the price towards the 
customer groups readers below marginal costs, this ceteris paribus increases 
number of readers. Therefore, advertising in this magazine becomes more at-
tractive and the demand for advertisement space increases. As a consequence, 
the price for the customer group advertisers can be increased (auctioning of the 
scarce advertisement space). Standard welfare analysis assuming ‘ordinary’ 
markets would yield 
 
Æ PREADERS < MC Î predatory pricing, and 
Æ PADVERTISERS > MC Î market power (exploitation of customers). 
 
This can be even more drastic if one considers the market for commercial TV 
that is offered free-to-air and financed by revenues from advertising. Thus the 
price towards the customer group ‘audience’ is zero (or sometimes even below 
zero if money is distributed among viewers, like some radio stations do), 
whereas the price towards the customer group ‘advertisers’ must be set above 
marginal cost in order to be profitable. Once again, standard analysis concludes  
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Æ PAUDIENCE ≤ 0 Î predatory pricing, and 
Æ PADVERTISERS > MC Î market power. 
 
From the perspective of multisided markets, however, such a price-setting 
represents a procompetitive business strategy and does not necessarily imply 
welfare losses. Maximising the (relevant) customer group audience / readers by 
‘subsidisation’ in order to maximise revenue from advertisements might repre-
sent a procompetitive strategy because incentives exist to provide the audi-
ence/readers with a preference-conformal product (Æ welfare increase) while, 
at the same time, the marginal willingness-to-pay of the advertisers equals their 
marginal utility (Æ no loss in efficiency)! In summary, competition on multi-
sided markets differs from competition on ‘ordinary’ markets. Suppliers in mul-
tisided markets face complex interrelations between prices, quantities and costs. 
At the present, only few general conclusions can be derived from this very 
young research concept and much (still) depends on case-by-case analyses. 
 
A second set of implications refers to (market) design decisions: suppliers in 
multisided markets attempt to attract customers on all sides of the market. In 
order to achieve this, suppliers try to stimulate the interaction between the two 
customer groups if a positive externality is conjectured and to reduce it if a 
negative externality is conjectured. Referring to our example of commercial 
TV, a supplier (TV program) might conjecture that audience wants a comfort-
able and undisturbed access to the programs and ‘unwanted’ commercials will 
interfere with these preferences. However, instead of reducing the ‘bad’ com-
mercials (in order to attract more ‘participation’ from the customer group audi-
ence), the supplier experiences incentives to integrate commercials in such a 
way that the audience cannot escape them (for instance, by switching channels 
during commercial breaks) – and, ideally, is not disturbed by them. One possi-
bility is to integrate advertisement into the program (product placement, surrep-
titious advertising) or to introduce sponsoring of special programs (movie X is 
presented by company Y). In other words, the supplier might want to bundle or 
tie content and commercials in order to make them inseparable for consump- 
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tion. Despite the audience becoming harmed (decrease of utility) on one hand, it 
benefits on the other hand since the supplier can attract more advertisers and, 
thereby, improve the price-performance-relation of the programs. As a conse-
quence, bundling and tying strategies that are viewed to be harmful in ‘ordi-
nary’ markets must be assessed differently in multisided markets. 
 
A third set of implications refers to the regulation of the externalities. Suppliers 
in multisided markets experience incentives to artificially increase positive ex-
ternalities among the customer groups and/or artificially decrease negative ex-
ternalities among the customer groups. Regarding commercial media this might 
involve efforts to improve the (positive) consumption reaction of audi-
ence/readers to commercials or to minimise the disruptive factor of commer-
cials on audience/readers. However, it should be made very clear that it is not 
trivial to combine these incentives. In particular, every multisided industry ex-
periences specific externality structures, making it difficult to draw general 
conclusions. Instead, case-by-case analysis of the respective industries against 
this theoretical framework seems to be more fruitful – at least in the current 
status of the underlying concepts. Therefore, we now want to demonstrate that 
professional sports markets fit into the framework of multisided markets. 
3.  Sports Markets as Multisided Markets 
To illustrate the idea of multisided markets, consider a professional soccer club 
playing in the, for instance, German premier league. In sports economics, a long 
tradition of reasoning views professional sports clubs (like premier league soc-
cer clubs) as resembling profit-maximizing firms (individual clubs) or indus-
tries (leagues) (Rottenberg 1956; Hoehn & Szymanski 1999; Fort & Quirk 
2004) rather than non-profit (serving the public good) sports clubs (as they of-
ten prefer to view themselves; somewhat supported e.g. by Madden 2008). 
Notwithstanding this controversy, it can still be assumed that their primary ob-
jective is to score victories. On one hand, as clubs compete for players, titles 
and coaches, profits and financial strength can be considered as derived objec- 
13 
tives and necessary conditions for sportive success. On the other hand, sportive 
success can be viewed as a prerogative for profit maximization. Most likely, the 
‘typical’ professional sports club (owner) possesses a non-trivial objective func-
tion that includes profit maximization elements as well as sportive success ele-
ments (Zimbalist 2002; Sloane 2006). For the purpose of the following discus-
sion, however, it is not necessary to distinguish the dominating causality direc-
tion between ‘creating revenues’ and ‘winning’ (Noll 2007: 410). 
 
Soccer clubs largely fund themselves through sponsoring, merchandizing, li-
censing television broadcasts, ticketing, and renting the stadium occasionally 
for purposes other than soccer.
3 Thus a professional soccer-club acts as a sup-
plier for several groups of customers: (1) soccer-fans buying tickets to watch a 
match live in the stadium (‘attendees’), (2) TV-channels buying broadcasting 
rights, (3) advertisers and sponsors buying advertisement space within the arena 
or ‘on the players’, (4) firms or other actors renting the stadium for other pur-
poses than soccer matches, and eventually (5) fans who buy merchandising-
products offered by the clubs. The issue at hand is whether the above-named 
costumer groups qualify as distinct. 
 
Attendees of a soccer match who buy tickets and watch the match live in the 
arena represent the first distinct customer group. They consist of consumers 
who seek an experience. Their interest is to enjoy the match, the atmosphere of 
a live-event, and to be part of a common (homogeneous) fan-group. 
 
The broadcasting TV channels again qualify as a distinct customer-group of 
soccer clubs. We can distinguish Pay TV (financed directly by the viewers) 
from Free TV (financed by revenues from advertisements) as well as private 
                                                            
3   Note that some of these areas of revenues are actually managed by sports associations on behalf of the 
individual clubs. We tend to neglect this in the following since it does not substantially change our 
reasoning.  
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TV channels from public ones (financed by tax revenues or special fees).
4 Pri-
vate Pay TV or Free TV channels can obviously be assumed to be profit-
maximizing enterprises. This may be more difficult with public TV that usually 
serves some societal interests (education of the public, preservation of cultural 
identity, etc.).
5 For the seasons 2006/07-2008/09 the German Soccer League 
(DFL)
6 sold the licence for broadcasting matches live to the Pay-TV channel 
Arena/Premiere. The German public free TV station ARD acquired the authori-
zation to broadcast a brief summary of all matches shortly after their end. 
Whereas Arena/Premiere is solely financed by subscription, at least half of the 
public TV channel ARD’s revenues are generated by advertisements. As far as 
soccer matches are concerned, broadcasting is (said to be) entirely financed by 
advertisements.
7 Despite their differences, both types of TV channels seek to 
maximize the amount of viewers in order to maximize their revenues either 
generated by subscriptions or commercials.
8 
 
The profit maximizing costumer group “advertisers and sponsors”, consisting of 
business companies from almost every industry, aims to maximize its media 
presence in order to increase the demand for their goods and services. They can 
promote their products and brands on items that are visual via TV, like the 
players’ shirts and perimeter advertisement, or on items that are visual only on 
location, i.e. promotion that is placed outside or within the arena like billboards 
or acoustic adverts. We will call advertisers that place advertisement in the 
                                                            
4   For a comprehensive discussion of the interrelations between different types of TV channels in regard 
to the demand of sports broadcasting rights see Noll (2007). 
5   Often, public TV channels are financed by a mixture of revenues from advertisers and public fees. 
This is usually accompanied by a mixture of targets – some combination of public interests (revenues 
from fees) and profit-maximization (revenues from commercials).  
6   The DFL is a profit-maximizing association of all 36 premier and second league soccer-clubs being in 
charge of centralized media marketing.  
7   Obviously, there is scope for conflicts of interests. However, we do not want to discuss this issue 
more detailed. 
8   Note that commercial TV channels themselves can be modelled as a platform for another multisided 
market where advertisers and viewers interact (e.g. Anderson & Gabszewicz 2006).  
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arena/stadium as ‘arena advertisers’ in order to distinguish them from advertis-
ers that place commercials on TV broadcasts. Note that the latter do not belong 
to this costumer group because they buy their product (advertisement space) di-
rectly from media (TV channels etc.). 
 
Furthermore, soccer clubs can rent the stadium to companies for other purposes 
than for soccer-based events. If so, clubs diversify and actively take part in 
other branches like concert and event management. Concert and event man-
agement companies try to find an appropriate location for every occasion; there-
fore, they will take considerations about infrastructure, maximum capacity and 
convenience into account and can be qualified as a distinct consumer group. 
 
One could argue that fans who buy merchandizing products sold by their fa-
vourite club could be a potential additional consumer group. Furthermore, 
sports suppliers could benefit from more people practising this sports discipline 
in their spare time and thus buy the necessary discipline-related equipment.
9 
However, it seems doubtful whether this group qualifies as distinct since it 
seems plausible that fans who buy tickets are most likely the same who buy 
merchandizing products in order to demonstrate their affiliation to the club and 
a homogenous group of fans.
10  
 
To meet the characteristics of a multisided market the costumer groups of a 
soccer club have to be indirectly connected by externalities which cannot be 
sufficiently internalized. In other words, positive or negative externalities be-
tween the different sides of a sports-market affect the utility of each market side 
indirectly. To realize the optimal profit ratio a utility-maximizing soccer club 
has to attract audience (attendees), TV channels, advertisers, and tenants simul-
                                                            
9   Think in particular about sports disciplines that require very specific equipment plus the existence of 
business interrelations between equipment producers and sports suppliers. 
10   Although we have to note that not all people who buy merchandizing products go to see matches live 
we consider these two consumer groups not to be clearly distinguished and delineated.  
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taneously. What kind of externalities can a soccer club expect to exist among 
each pair of customer groups?  
(I) Attendees – arena advertisers 
Advertisers prefer platforms that attract a high amount of attendees; the more 
fans watch a match in the stadium the wider the distribution of the advertise-
ments is. This positive effect for arena advertisers can have a negative impact 
on the demand for tickets though. (An increase in) advertisement can lead to a 
reduction of attendees’ utility if these develop disfavour while the intensity of 
promotion rises. Thus it might be reasonable to assume a negative relationship 
between the amount of advertisement and the attendees’ benefit.
11 A significant 
negative effect can also be ascertained at least for perimeter advertising, par-
ticularly with regard to electronic soccer boards (Hartwich 2007).
12 If this is the 
case, the demand for tickets will decrease which again will cause a negative 
feedback on the demand for advertisements and so forth (negative feedback 
loops).
13 A club reducing ticket prices may increase the number of attendees 
which in turn will make advertising in this stadium more attractive. Conse-
quently the demand for advertisement space increases, so that the prices for the 
customer group “arena advertisers” can be increased, too. Put differently, clubs 
may subsidize the ticket prices (attendees) by the prices for advertisement (ad-
vertisers).  
                                                            
11   Drawing on media economics, the general presumption is that audience and readers suffer from ad-
vertisement, at least if the frequency of commercials exceeds certain thresholds (inter alia Evans 
2003; Anderson & Gabszewicz 2006). However, while this seems to be generally correct, some stud-
ies find a positive value of some advertising on audience/readers (e.g. Kaiser & Wright 2006). In 
sports markets, an additional element might be that sports fans tend to disfavour the commercialisa-
tion of the sport, symbolised by higher frequencies and a stronger presence of advertising.  
12   With electronic soccer boards flashing and see-sawing adverts in the display change every few sec-
onds which can negatively affect the attention paid to the match. 
13   Obviously, a market can also exhibit positive feedback loops if customers’ benefit from attending a 
match rises due to advertisements. This would imply that the adverts contain useful information for 
attendees. One may doubt knowing that perimeter advertising is limited to naming the advertisers.  
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(II) Attendees – TV channels  
Different externalities can be analysed in regard to the interrelationship between 
the two customer groups attendees and TV channels. Attendees might view 
watching a soccer match on TV and attending the stadium to be substitutes. 
Thus, the existence of accessible and prompt broadcasting (for instance, live-
broadcasting in Free TV) can decrease demand for tickets (negative externality 
from TV channels towards attendees). While this seems rather plausible for 
live-broadcasting, a negative externality is not unambiguous for time-delayed 
broadcasting since it might well benefit attendees as they can see specially en-
tertaining sequences again and in slow motion, from different angles and so on. 
Programmes that summarize all games of a matchday by showing extracts 
probably produce a positive externality on attendees as they will generally be 
interested in not missing the best scenes from alternative matches. In summary, 
it seems plausible to assume that the bigger the time lag is between the end of 
the matches and the (full-length) broadcasting time on (Free) TV, the higher the 
demand for tickets will be c.p. With summarizing programmes, this seems to be 
more complex. 
 
The ‘participation’ of attendees produces a positive externality on TV channels 
since the popularity of a sports discipline matters for the channels’ business 
strategy. Large crowds in stadiums support popularity, enhance the experience 
character of the match (‘must attend’) and, moreover, create an atmosphere that 
also improves the broadcasting. A broadcast from an arena that is crowded and 
full of enthusiastic fans is more attractive to the customers of TV channels than 
a broadcast from an empty stadium. 
(III) Attendees – tenants  
Attendees could cause positive externalities for tenants if a high average de-
mand for tickets, i.e. a high number of (weekly) attendees result in investments 
in, for instance, a better technical endowment or an improvement in the infra-
structural environment of the arena that also benefits concert and event manag-
ers. Those improvements and modernizations may attract more people for con- 
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certs or events. Additionally, one could even think of soccer fans being more 
willing to join an event taking place in the stadium they know and like due to 
familiarity reasons.
14 Thus, bi-directional positive externalities between atten-
dees and tenants can be identified – however, they might be rather weak or even 
insignificant. 
(IV) TV channels – arena advertisers 
Consumers of goods and services can be more widely reached by commercials 
than through any other medium (like print, internet etc.). Therefore, advertisers 
in the arena and sponsors of soccer teams will indirectly profit from clubs sell-
ing extensive broadcasting rights to TV channels (positive externality from en-
hanced broadcasting towards sponsors and arena advertisers). Sponsors will in-
vest more if they know that their promotion will be seen on TV as this will en-
hance the degree of popularity and, hence, the probability to sell. These positive 
externalities for arena advertisers and sponsors will even increase if matches are 
repeatedly broadcasted by Pay TV, private and public TV channels. As a con-
sequence arena advertisers and sponsors may increase their utility without bear-
ing higher costs since they do not have to compensate any TV channels for 
causing positive externalities. 
 
TV channels, on the other hand, may be harmed by extensive arena advertise-
ments and club sponsors due to cannibalization effects. Companies placing ad-
vertisement in the arena might view this as a substitute for buying advertise-
ment space on TV (placing commercials) and, thus, refrain from doing the lat-
ter. Therefore, extensive advertisement in the arena, on players’ uniforms, etc. 
tends to reduce demand (and revenues) from advertisers for commercial TV 
(negative externality from arena advertisers/sponsors towards TV channels).   
                                                            
14   Of course this argument works the other way around as well.   
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(V) TV channels – tenants  
The underlying rationale is similar to that brought up for attendees and tenants; 
TV channels may cause positive externalities for tenants if broadcasting soccer 
matches results in e.g. a better technical endowment or an improvement in the 
infrastructural environment. In addition an increase of a stadiums’ popularity 
via broadcasting could again yield a higher demand for concert tickets. One 
could argue here that people may become less reluctant to attend an arena they 
already know from TV, in other words, a stadiums’ popularity can even en-
hance the probability to join an event due to familiarity reasons. Once again, 
these bi-directional positive externalities might be rather weak and perhaps 
even insignificant. 
(VI) Arena advertisers – tenants    
Arena advertisers may profit from concert and event managers renting a sta-
dium provided that perimeter advertising, billboards and other types of promo-
tion will not be removed for occasions other than soccer matches. On the other 
hand, advertisement may lead to a better infrastructure tenants would benefit 
from. The same reservation as in (V) holds.  
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Figure 1.  Externalities among different consumer groups of soccer clubs 
From this exemplary discussion of a premier league professional soccer club, it 
can be seen that sports markets actually possess the characteristics of multisided 
markets. This assessment does not fundamentally change if one considers other 
professional sports like (US) baseball, football and basketball or tennis, golf as 
well as Formula One (premium motor sports). In the latter case, for instance, 
basically the same customer groups can be identified: audience at the race cir-
cuit buying tickets, TV channels buying broadcasting rights, circuit advertisers 
buying trackside advertisement space and sponsors buying on-car advertisement 
space as well as event management companies organizing e.g. open air rock 
concerts. However, Formula One differs from our soccer example in terms of 
the supplier structure. In the ordinary soccer league, it is a good proxy to model 
the club as the basic supplier as he (i) provides the team, (ii) owns or has rented 
the arena, and (iii) forms together with the other clubs of the league the relevant  
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sports association. In contrast, in Formula One several supplier groups have to 
be distinguished (in addition to the distinct customer groups): (i) the teams 
(dominated by car manufacturers), (ii) the circuit owners, (iii) the sports asso-
ciation FIA, and (iv) the commercial association FOA. None of the 2008 cir-
cuits are owned by a team or manufacturer. The FIA (Fédération Internationale 
de l’Automobiles) is not an association of participants (teams/manufacturers) 
and instead consists of national motor sports clubs and associations. The FOA 
(Formula One Administration Ltd.) is a company owned by a chain of other 
companies and, at the end of the day, by CVC Capital Partners and Bernie Ec-
clestone. FOA has bought the exclusive rights to market the product “Formula 
One World Championship” from FIA in a long-run contract. This, admittedly 
rather special, supply structure points towards a missing dimension in the multi-
sided markets framework: while complex costumer interactions are addressed, 
complex supplier interactions (not competitor interactions!) are not yet in-
cluded. Notwithstanding, applying the multisided markets framework offers in-
teresting and valuable insights for the analysis of professional sports markets as 
we outline in the following section. 
4.  Some Implications for Sports Business und Regula-
tion 
The following section does not attempt to provide rigorous and full-blown 
analyses of the discussed issues. This would indeed require further research and 
stand-alone papers on these issues. We ‘merely’ want to outline that analysing 
problems of sports business with the theoretical framework of multisided mar-
kets offers potential for explanation and policy conclusions that complements 
existing wisdom. Therefore, we only sketch some implications and attempt to 
motivate further research.
15  
                                                            
15   Accordingly, we waive comprehensive reviews of the existing (non-multisided market) literature on 
these matters.   
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4.1.  Pricing Strategies 
On multisided markets the existence of multiple groups of consumers affects 
the suppliers’ pricing strategy because of complex interrelations between prices, 
quantities and costs. Hence, suppliers have to take into consideration that set-
ting prices for one customer group influences demand quantities of the other 
customer group(s). Therefore the amount of transactions made depends on the 
prices on each market side. As a result it can be efficient to set a price below the 
marginal costs or even a zero-price to subsidize one or several groups of con-
sumers by other ones. 
Profit-maximizing Broadcasting Revenues 
To illustrate possible effects on quantities and prices charged, let us firstly stick 
to the example of German soccer clubs. In 2005, for instance, the DFL sold 
broadcasting-rights (encompassing the years 2006-2009) to the Pay TV channel 
Arena for 240 million Euros total per annum although the competing Pay TV 
channel Premiere offered the much higher amount of 300 million Euros. At 
first glance, this might seem not to be a rational, profit-maximizing decision 
made by the 36 clubs of the first and second German soccer division. This im-
pression does change, however, as soon as we take suppliers’ strategies on mul-
tisided markets explicitly into account (Hartwich 2007). Besides the amounts of 
money paid by the channels the offers include restrictions concerning the 
broadcasting times in Free-TV. Premiere’s 300 million Euros-bid restricted the 
free TV channels to begin broadcasting before 10 p.m. whereas Arena author-
ized for broadcasts starting at 6 p.m. offering no more than 240 million Euros, 
though. The minor offer for this latter option seems reasonable as a free and 
immediate summary will decrease the demand for subscriptions (Pay TV chan-
nels’ main source of income) and therefore channels’ revenues. Nevertheless, 
the DFL presented its choice as a fan-friendly decision, taking care of soccer-
fans, keeping them able to watch at least a free summary of all matches 
promptly after their end (let us refer to this as the ‘charity-approach’).   
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If we think of the multiple consumer groups of soccer clubs, their interrelations 
and existing externalities, a more differentiated view than the ‘charity-
approach’ evolves. Soccer clubs face a trade-off between revenues generated by 
selling broadcasting licences and those generated by other customer groups. In 
Germany traditionally most professional soccer games take place on Saturdays 
between 3.30 p.m. and 5.15 p.m., and Free TV traditionally offers a very popu-
lar summary on Saturday somewhere between 6 p.m. and 8 p.m. If this type of 
free accessibility of a TV summary in due course after the games have been fin-
ished represents an important asset for arena visitors and, furthermore, contrib-
ute significantly to audience building (attracting new fans – younger ones, fam-
ily members, etc. – that subsequently will visit games, buy merchandise and so 
on), it can be a profit-maximizing strategy to reinforce the positive externality 
between TV broadcasts and attendees. In a similar vein, an easy accessible and 
widespread Free-TV broadcast enhances the willingness-to-pay from arena ad-
vertisers and sponsors because they can reach a broader audience by their ad-
vertisements (that are also seen on TV and not only by the attendees; Hartwich 
2007). In the case of the DFL, an alternative explanation to the charity-
approach might be that the Arena offer was the profit-maximizing bid if the 
combination of price for broadcasting rights and influence on positive external-
ities between Free TV broadcasts and attendees / popularity of soccer as well as 
arena advertisers / sponsors is considered. 
 
Interestingly, the negotiations of the follow-up contract brought a very different 
result. In 2008, the DFL chose the absolute highest offer that included the abol-
ishment of early Saturday evening summaries in Free TV and, instead, entailed 
a far-reaching shifting of soccer broadcasting to Pay TV with extensive exclu-
sivity rights. The association of professional soccer clubs agreed to sell licences 
for live-broadcasting exclusively to a company named Sirius. Sirius had offered 
500 million Euros per annum for a six-year deal and intended to resell most of 
the broadcast rights to Premiere (Pay TV), an amount that doubled the previous 
price and clearly offset offers with larger Free-TV involvement. Particularly, 
the clubs agreed to Premiere’s demand that summaries of the matches should  
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not be shown on Free TV before 8 p.m. Does this imply that (i) the DFL gave 
up on its charity approach, or (ii) it had no other possibility to uphold the inter-
national competitiveness of German soccer clubs (as the DFL claims),
16 or (iii) 
the externalities between TV channels and attendees / popularity of soccer have 
changed wherefore a different pricing strategy towards the distinct customer 
groups has become profitable?  
 
Focusing on the third line of explanation – for the purpose of this paper – one 
could think about the influence of the World Cup and the European Football 
Championship that took place in the meantime. In particular, the World Cup in 
Germany in 2006 (but to a lesser extent also the European Championship in 
Austria and Switzerland 2008) caused an unexpected boom in the popularity of 
soccer (that was somewhat stagnating or even slightly declining – admittedly 
from a high level – before), which implies that the positive externality between 
close-to-the-matches Free TV summary broadcast and attendees / popularity 
might have been alleviated to some extent. The own-price elasticity of ticket 
(and merchandise) demand might have become more inelastic (stronger fan ba-
sis) as well as the cross-quantity elasticity (reduction of the positive externali-
ty). This would imply a shift in the optimal pricing strategy of the sports associ-
ation towards a higher pricing of broadcasting rights and less regard to accessi-
bility of broadcasting – which exactly is what happened. An explanation along 
these lines would require and deserve more research as it promises a valid ex-
planation of the observed strategy change of the DFL. 
 
Next to explaining such a change in business strategy, the theory of multisided 
markets might also help to assess whether this strategy switch justifies public 
intervention. The Federal Cartel Office (FCO) of Germany most recently pro-
hibited the DFL-Sirius deal (Bundeskartellamt 2008). Centralised marketing of 
                                                            
16   The clubs claim that broadcast revenues are very important especially for small clubs to survive and 
to stay competitive especially regarding international contests like the UEFA Cup or the Champions 
League. More money is said to be needed in order to be able to contract valuable players even in fu-
ture (Manager-magazin, 18.7.08 ; Sportsillustrated, 24.8.08).  
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broadcasting rights by a sports association represents a cartel of suppliers of 
soccer games (the clubs), something that is generally prohibited according to 
competition law (§ 1 German Act against Restraints of Competition ARC). Ex-
emptions are only possible if – among some other conditions – consumers (i.e. 
fans; not intermediate customers like the TV channels) benefit from the cartel 
(§ 2 ARC). The FCO argued, however, that the new model did not go far 
enough in protecting the rights of consumers. It effectively prohibited the deal 
demanding that the highlights of most of the matches must be available to a 
broad population and need to be shown before 8 p.m. A later broadcast would 
lure people to Pay TV leading to higher prices for consumers.
17 A sound eco-
nomic foundation of such reasoning by referring to the theory of multisided 
market would fit into the ‘more economic approach’ that is currently promoted 
in European competition policy. Analysing the DFL-Sirius contract against the 
background of multisided market theory could, of course, on the one hand lead 
to a better economic fundament of the prohibition decision but, on the other 
hand, also to the finding that there actually is no significant competitive harm in 
regard to consumers. 
Broadcasting Rights, Ticket Prices, and Negative Prices 
Moreover, one could also think of clubs subsidizing ticket prices by charging 
higher prices for broadcasting rights. Ticket prices have an effect on TV chan-
nels’ demand to purchase broadcasting rights, which becomes all the more true 
if we take broadcasting time into account. Potential attendees can choose to 
subscribe to a Pay TV channel, watch matches live or see brief summaries on 
Free TV. It seems plausible though to assume that the bigger the time lag be-
tween the end of the matches and the broadcasting time on Free TV the higher 
the demand for tickets as well as Pay TV subscriptions and the lower the de-
mand for the Free TV programme will be c.p. The allocation of licences can be 
                                                            
17   Noticeably, the FCO accepts that centralized marketing of broadcasting rights can, in principle, im-
prove consumer welfare. This is controversial in sports economics as for instance Noll (2007) derives 
generally negative welfare effects of centralized broadcasting.  
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controlled for by the DFL with regard to ticket prices and prices of broadcasting 
licences, simply by varying the prescriptions for broadcasting times. Taking all 
customer groups into account subsidizing may be a procompetitive strategy for 
clubs aiming to maximize total revenues. 
 
If we turn to less popular sports disciplines than soccer in Europe, then, besides 
subsidizing ticket prices (i.e. charging a price lower than the marginal costs), it 
can even be a reasonable business strategy to for a sports association to pay TV 
channels for broadcasting (i.e. to set a negative price) in order to make the (per-
haps largely unknown) discipline more popular among TV viewers, thus attract-
ing audience in the arenas as well as buyers of merchandise and/or discipline-
specific equipment, thus attracting sponsors. In the long run, this might even 
lead to an upward spiral so that eventually TV is developing a willingness-to-
pay for broadcasting rights. The theory of multisided markets offers a natural 
framework for analysing such types of strategies. 
4.2. Design  Decisions and Regulation of Externalities 
To make pricing strategies even more effective professional sports associations 
may change or modify the play in order to attract more participation from one 
side of the market (i.e. consumer groups), for instance making the game more 
TV-friendly by 
 
•  introducing extra breaks, in which TV channels with live coverage can 
place ads. For example U.S. football and basketball have introduced spe-
cific time-outs with no other purpose than to accommodate additional 
commercials but avoiding that TV viewers miss important parts of the 
game (Leeds & von Allmen 2008: 88)  
 
•  introducing a TV-friendly format. An enhancement of the visibility of ac-
tion (e.g. coloured Judogi in Judo) may be one example  
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•  modifying the rules i.e. the institutional framework of a game in order to 
make the sports event more accessible for non-expert viewers (by intro-
ducing a more transparent and easier evaluation scheme, etc.). Moreover 
professional sports could be made more attractive for TV coverage by in-
creasing the competitive balance or making things more spectacular and 
thrilling. In the Formula 1 racing rules modified: teams are obliged to use 
the same sort of tires produced by only one manufacturer during a race. 
This aims at enhancing the smaller teams’ ability to compete with finan-
cially stronger and prominent teams. In addition the rules for the qualify-
ing session (determining the position at the start of the motor race) were 
changed to make it more exciting, seeking to attract more viewers 
 
•  attracting or developing media-friendly protagonists. For instance, clubs 
may school successful players or athletes in behaviour towards media or 
allow for TV appearance. The German soccer club Mainz 05 (second di-
vision) permitted its popular coach Jürgen Klopp to perform as an expert 
on TV evaluating the performances of players of the national German 
soccer team – a role in which he somewhat achieved star status. Addi-
tionally, sports associations might promote athletes with the ‘right’ geo-
graphical and national background or such with natural attractiveness for 
fans etc. The best female racer in U.S. single-seater motor sports, the at-
tractive Danica Patrick, is rumoured to be advantaged by series organis-
ers. We do not know whether this is true, however, such a strategy would 
fit into this explanatory framework and be rational for series organisers
18  
 
•  varying the distribution of sport events. German soccer clubs seek to 
adapt the number of matches played on every matchday (Friday, Saturday 
                                                            
18   Going to the extremes, the combination of (media) customer-oriented rules and format as well as an 
accompanying influence on the results of sportive competition can explain the emergence of ‘sports 
imitations’ like Wrestling. However, since in most sports disciplines fans prefer – at least to some 
minimum extent – ‘true’ and ‘fair’ sports competition (the ‘best’ shall win), suppliers of professional 
sports events usually seek a balance between attracting new fans through a stronger participation of 
the customer group ‘media’ and preventing to disattract ‘old’ fans by introducing too much ‘show’.    
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and Sunday) to increase attendance. One idea is to start Sunday matches 
earlier than 5 p.m. to make it easier for fans to attend away games. Cur-
rently fans may have problems to get home the on same day, not being 
forced to stay over night (depending on the distance of their hometown). 
As far as the Formula 1 is concerned starting times of overseas races ac-
count for the time shift in order to attract a maximum of viewers in the 
most important European market.  
 
Furthermore, clubs may try to alleviate negative attitudes of attendees towards 
arena advertisement and sponsors (negative externality from advertisers on at-
tendees). One possibility could be the usage of screens and electronic perime-
ters for visualizing sweepstakes accomplished for attendees in breaks or before 
the beginning of a match. Thus fans may get the impression that they can ex-
perience a benefit from the addition of advertising space, even if this effect 
might be weak. Sports clubs and their associations could try to promote the de-
pendency of media on broadcasting soccer matches (premium content). How-
ever, it might be doubtful whether this can actually be done. In general, ap-
proaches may be effective if clubs achieve to increase welfare by supplying at-
tendees with a preference-conformal product, while, at the same time, equaliz-
ing the marginal willingness-to-pay of advertisers or TV channels with their 
marginal utility. The latter condition needs to be fulfilled or else efficiency-
losses would appear.   
 
All these issues and many more deserve an in-depth treatment and the frame-
work of multisided market theory represents a promising tool for such analyses. 
5.  Conclusion 
Despite still being younger than a decade, the theory of multisided market has 
offered numerous valuable insights for the analysis of non-ordinary industries 
in which a supplier serves two distinct customer groups that are indirectly inter-
related by externalities. Examples include payment systems, matching agencies,  
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commercial media and software platforms. However, professional sports mar-
kets have largely been neglected so far in this kind of research although they 
possess the characteristics of multisided markets. We contribute to filling this 
gap by describing the platform elements of professional suppliers of sports 
events and outlining problems where an application of this theoretical frame-
work is likely to provide valuable insights and to add to the existing knowledge. 
Among these problems are integrative pricing strategies of sports clubs towards 
such different customer groups like attendees, broadcasters, sponsors, etc., in-
cluding their welfare and antitrust implications, design decisions of sports asso-
ciations in order to promote positive feedback loops among the customer 
groups as well as strategies to reinforce positive externalities among customer 
groups and alleviate negative ones. 
 
This paper can only outline some of the interesting and challenging fields that 
could be rewarding for introducing the theory of multisided markets into sports 
economics. We do not provide full-blown, in-depth analyses of the sketched 
problems and insights. However, we describe a new framework for research 
that offers potentials to complement and deepen the existing literature in sports 
economics and management. It is the main goal of this paper to stimulate fur-
ther research in the analysis of sports markets and business.  
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